We introduce a natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic FO. The extension adds two novel features to FO. The first one of these is the capacity to add new points to models and new tuples to relations. The second one is the possibility of recursive looping when a formula is evaluated using a semantic game. We first define a game-theoretic semantics for the logic and then prove that the expressive power of the logic corresponds in a canonical way to the recognition capacity of Turing machines. Finally, we show how to incorporate generalized quantifiers into the logic and argue for a highly natural connection between oracles and generalized quantifiers.
Introduction
We introduce a natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic FO. This extension essentially adds two features to basic FO. The first one of these is the capacity to add new points to models and new tuples to relations. The second one is the possibility of looping when a formula is evaluated using a semantic game.
Logics with different kinds of recursive looping capacities have been widely studied in the context of finite model theory [16] . Typically such logics are fragments of second-order predicate logic. A crucial weakness in the expressivity of k-th order predicate logic is that only a finite amount of information can be encoded by a finite number of quantified relations over a finite domain. Intuitively, there is no infinitely expandable memory available. Thus k-th order logic is not Turing-complete. To overcome this limitation, we add to first-order logic operators that enable the addition of new elements to the domains of models and new tuples to relations. Coupling this feature with the possibility of recursive looping leads to a very natural Turing-complete extension of first-order logic.
In addition to operators that enable the extension of domains and relations, we also consider an operator that enables the deletion of tuples of relations. It would be natural to also include to our framework an operator that enables the deletion of domain points. This indeed could (and perhaps should) be done, but for purely technical reasons, we ignore this possibility.
We provide a game-theoretic semantics for the novel logic. A nice feature of the logic-let us simply call it L , or logic L -is that it simulates halting as well as diverging computations of Turing machines in a very natural way. This behavioural correspondence between Turing machines and the logic L stems from the appropriate use of game-theoretic concepts. Let us have a closer look at this matter.
Let A be a model and ϕ a formula of first-order logic. Let f be an assignment function that interprets the free variables of ϕ in the domain A of A. The semantic game G(A, f , ϕ) is played between the two players ∃ and ∀ in the usual way (see, e.g., [11, 18] ). If the verifying player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game G(A, f , ϕ), we write A, f |= + ϕ and say that ϕ is true in (A, f ). If, on the other hand, the falsifying player ∀ has a winning strategy, we write A, f |= − ϕ and say that ϕ is false in (A, f ). Since ϕ is a first-order formula, we have A, f |= + ϕ iff it is not the case that A, f |= − ϕ.
If ϕ is a formula of IF logic [12] or dependence logic [21] , for example, the situation changes. It is then possible that neither player has a winning strategy in the semantic game. This results in a third truth value (indeterminate). Turing machines of course exhibit analogous behaviour: on an input word w, a Turing machine can halt in an accepting state, halt in a rejecting state, or diverge.
The logic L incorporates each of these three options in its semantics in a canonical way. For each Turing machine TM, there exists a sentence of ϕ TM such that TM accepts the encoding of a finite model A iff A, f |= + ϕ TM , and furthermore, TM rejects the encoding of A iff A, f |= − ϕ TM . Therefore TM diverges on the encoding of A iff neither the verifying nor the falsifying player has a winning strategy in the game invoving A, f and ϕ. For the converse, for each formula χ of the logic L , there exists a Turing machine TM χ such that a similar full symmetry exists between semantic games involving χ and computations involving TM χ . By Turing-completeness of a logic we mean exactly this kind of a behavioral equivalence between Turing machines and formulae.
The moves in the semantic games for L are exactly as in first-order logic in positions involving the first-order operators ∃x, ∨, ¬. In positions of the type Ix ϕ, a fresh point is inserted into the domain of the model investigated, and the variable x is interpreted to refer to the fresh point. There are similar operators for the insertion (deletion) of tuples into (from) relations. The recursive looping is facilitated by operators such as the ones in the formula 1 P(x) ∨ 1), where the player ending up in a position involving the novel atomic formula 1 can jump back into a position involving 1 P(x) ∨ 1 . Semantic games are played for at most omega rounds 1 and can be won only by moving to a position involving a first-order atomic formula. Winning and losing in positions involving first-order atoms is determined exactly as in first-order logic.
Operators that bear a resemblance to the ones used in the logic L have of course been considered in logical contexts before. Lauri Hella has suggested (personal communication) extending first-order logic with recursive looping constructors that resemble those investigated in this article. His idea involves studying fixed point logics using a game-theoretic semantics with somewhat different kinds of winning conditions than the ones we shall formulate below. The framework does not involve modifying the domains of structures. The insertion (deletion) of tuples to (from) relations is an important ingredient in dynamic complexity (see, e.g., [8, 19] ), although motivated and used there in a way that is quite different from the approach in this article. Logics that involve jumping into different model domains include for example the sort logic of Väänänen ([20] , [22] ), a logic which can in a sense be regarded as the strongest possible model theoretic logic. Other systems with similar constructors or motivations to those considered in this article include for example BGS logic [2] , WHILE languages [1] and abstract state machines [10, 3] . See also the articles [5] and [14] .
The reason we believe that the logic L is particularly interesting lies in its simplicity and exact behavioural correspondence with Turing machines on one hand, and in the fact that it provides a canonical unified perspective on logic and computation on the other hand. The logic L canonically extends ordinary first-order logic to a Turing-complete framework, and thereby serves not only as a novel logic, but also as a novel model of computation. It is also worth noting that the fresh operators of L nicely capture two classes of constructors that are omnipresent in the practise of mathematics: scenarios where fresh points are added to investigated constructions (or fresh lines are drawn, etc.) play a central role in geometry, and recursive looping operators are found everywhere in mathematical practise, often indicated with the help of the famous three dots (...).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define some preliminary notions and give a formal account of the syntax L . In Section 3 we develop the semantics of L . In Section 4 we establish the Turing-completeness of L in restriction to the class of word models. In Section 5 we use the results of Section 4 in order to establish Turing-completeness of L in the class of all finite models. In Section 6 we show how to extend L with generalized quantifiers. We also briefly discuss the conceptiual link between oracles and generalized quantifiers.
Preliminaries
Let Z + denote the set of positive integers. Let VAR := { v i | i ∈ Z + } be the set of variable symbols used in first-order logic. We mainly use metavariables x, y, z, x i , y i , z i , etc., in order to refer to the variables in VAR. Let k ∈ Z + . We let VAR SO (k) be a countably infinite set of k-ary relation variables. We let VAR SO 
Let τ denote a complete relational vocabulary, i.e., τ is the union k∈Z + τ k , where τ k is a countably infinite set of k-ary relation symbols. Let σ ⊆ τ. Define the language L * (σ ) to be the smallest set S such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. If x 1 , ..., x k are variable symbols and R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol, then R(
3. If x, y are variable symbols, then x = y ∈ S.
7. If x is a variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then ∃x ϕ ∈ S.
8. If x is a variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then Ix ϕ ∈ S.
9. If x 1 , ..., x k are variable symbols, R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then I Rx 1 ,...,x k ϕ ∈ S.
10. If x 1 , ..., x k are variable symbols, X ∈ VAR SO a k-ary relation variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then I Xx 1 ,...,x k ϕ ∈ S.
11. If x 1 , ..., x k are variable symbols, R ∈ σ a k-ary relation symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then D Rx 1 ,...,x k ϕ ∈ S.
12. If x 1 , ..., x k are variable symbols, X ∈ VAR SO a k-ary relation variable symbol and ϕ ∈ S, then
13. If ϕ ∈ S and k ∈ N, then kϕ ∈ S.
While we could develop a sensible semantics for the language L * (σ ), we shall only consider a sublanguage L (σ ) ⊆ L * (σ ) that avoids certain undesirable situations in semantic games. Let ϕ ∈ L * (σ ) be a formula. Assume that ϕ contains an atomic subformula k ∈ N and another subformula k ψ. Assume that k is not a subformula of k ψ. Then we say that ϕ has a non-standard jump. Note that we define that every instance of the syntactically same subformula of ϕ is a distinct subformula: for example, the formula (P(x)∧ P(x)) is considered to have three subformulae, these being the left and right instances of P(x) and the formula (P(x) ∧ P(x)) itself. Thus for example the formula k(P(x) ∧ k) ∧ k (P(x) ∧ k) has a non-standard jump. We define L (σ ) to be the largest subset of L * (σ ) that does not contain formulae with non-standard jumps.
The reason we wish to avoid non-standard jumps is simple and will become entirely clear when we define the semantics of L (σ ) in Section 3 . Let us consider an example that demonstrates the undesirable situation. Consider the formula k ∧ ∃x k P(x) of L * (σ ). As will become clear in Section 3, it is possible to end up in the related semantic game in a position involving the atomic formula P(x) without first visiting a position involving the formula ∃x k P(x). This is undesirable, since a related variable assignment function will then not necessarily give any value to the variable x. For this reason we limit attention to the fragment L (σ ) containing only formulae without non-standard jumps.
Before defining the semantics of the language L (σ ), we make a number of auxiliary definitions. Let A, B, etc., be models. We let A, B, etc., denote the domains of the models in the usual way. A function f that interprets a finite subset of VAR ∪ VAR SO in the domain of a model A is called an assignment.
where X ∈ VAR SO is a k-ary relation variable and S ⊆ A k . We will also construct valuations of, say, the
The interpretation of these constructions is clear.
We define the set of free variables free(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈ L (σ ) as follows.
free(¬ϕ) = free(ϕ).

free((ϕ
∧ ψ)) = free(ϕ) ∪ free(ψ). 7. free(∃xϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x}. 8. free(Ix ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x}. 9. free(I Rx 1 ,...,x k ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x 1 , ..., x k }.
free(I Xx
1 ,...,x k ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {X , x 1 , ..., x k }. 11. free(D Rx 1 ,...,x k ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x 1 , ..., x k }. 12. free(D Xx 1 ,...,x k ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {X , x 1 , ..., x k }.
free(kϕ) = free(ϕ).
A formula ϕ of L (σ ) is a sentence if free(ϕ) = / 0.
A Semantics for L (σ )
In this section we define a game-theoretic semantics for the language L (σ ). The semantics extends the well-known game-theoretic semantics of first-order logic (see, e.g., [18] ). The semantic games are played by two players ∃ and ∀. Let ϕ be a formula of L (σ ). Let A be a σ -model, and let f be an assignment that interprets the free variables of ϕ in A. Let # ∈ {+, −} be simply a symbol. The quadruple (A, f , #, ϕ) defines a semantic game G(A, f , #, ϕ). The set of positions in the game G(A, f , #, ϕ) is the smallest set S such that the following conditions hold.
we define B ∪ {b} to be the σ -model C where b is simply a fresh isolated point, i.e., the domain of C is B ∪ {b}, and
For each relation symbol P ∈ σ \ {R}, we have P B * := P B . The models B and B * have the same domain.
The models B and B * have the same domain.
The game G(A, f , #, ϕ) is played as follows.
1. Every play of the game begins from the position (A, f , #, ϕ). 
. Otherwise define C := / 0. The play of the game continues from the position (B, g * , # ′ , ψ), where We write A, f |= + ϕ iff the player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game G(A, f , +, ϕ). We write A, f |= − ϕ iff ∃ has a winning strategy in the game G(A, f , −, ϕ). By duality of the rules of the game, it is easy to see that ∃ has a winning strategy in G(A, f , −, ϕ) iff ∀ has a winning strategy in G (A, f , +, ϕ) . Similarly, ∃ has a winning strategy in G(A, f , +, ϕ) iff ∀ has a winning strategy in G(A, f , −, ϕ).
Let ϕ be a sentence of L (σ ). We write A |= + ϕ iff A, / 0 |= + ϕ, where / 0 denotes the empty valuation. Similarly, we write A |= − ϕ iff A, / 0 |= − ϕ.
Turing-Completeness
Let σ be a finite nonempty set of unary relation symbols. let Succ be a binary relation symbol. A word model A over the vocabulary {Succ} ∪ σ is defined as follows.
1. The domain of A is a nonempty finite set.
2. The binary predicate Succ is a successor relation over A, i.e., a binary relation corresponding to a linear order, but with maximum out-degree and in-degree equal to one.
3. Let b ∈ A denote the smallest element with respect to Succ. We have b ∈ P A for each P ∈ σ .
(This is because we do not want to consider models with the empty domain; the empty word will correspond to the word model with exactly one element.) For each element a ∈ A \{b}, there exists exactly one predicate P ∈ σ such that a ∈ P A .
Word models canonically encode finite words. For example the word abbaa over the alphabet {a, b} is encoded by the word model M over the vocabulary {Succ, P a , P b } defined as follows.
1. M = {0, ..., 5}.
Succ
M is the canonical successor relation on M.
3. P M a = {1, 4, 5} and P M b = {2, 3}. If w is a finite word, we let M (w) denote its encoding by a word model in the way defined above. If W is a set of finite words, then
We define computation of Turing machines in the standard way that involves a possible tape alphabet in addition to an input alphabet. These two alphabets are disjoint. Let Σ be a finite nonempty alphabet. Then Σ * is the set of all inputs to a Turing machine TM whose input alphabet is Σ. During computation, TM may employ an additional finite set S of tape symbols. That set S is the tape alphabet of TM. There is a nice loose analogy between tape alphabet symbols of Turing machines and relation variable symbols in VAR SO used in formulas of L . 
Let U ⊆ Σ * be the set of words u such that TM halts in a rejecting state with the input u. Then for all w
Proof. We shall define a sentence ϕ TM such that the semantic games involving ϕ TM simulate the action of TM. Let Q be the set of states of TM. For each q ∈ Q, reserve a variable symbol x q . Furthermore, let y state be a variable symbol. Intuitively, the equality y state = x q will hold in the semantic game G(M (w), / 0, +, ϕ TM ) exactly when TM is in the state q during a run with the input w. Simulating the action of the head of the Turing machine TM is a bit more complicated, since when defining the new position of the head with a subformula of ϕ TM , information concerning the old position must be somehow accessible. 4 Fix two variables x 1 head and x 2 head . These variables will encode the position of the head. Define three further variables y 1 head , y 2 head , and y head . The tape of TM will be encoded by the (dynamically extendible) successor relation Succ, which is a part of the model (or models, to be exact) constructed during the semantic game. The variables x 1 head and x 2 head will denote elements of the successor relation. Intuitively, y head = y 1 head will mean that x 1 head indicates the current position of the head of TM, while y head = y 2 head will mean that x 2 head indicates the position of the head of TM. The value of x 1 head will always be easily definable based on the value of x 2 head , and vice versa, the value of x 2 head will be definable based on the value of x 1 head . If TM employs tape alphabet symbols s ∈ Σ, these can be encoded by unary relation variables X s . Intuitively, if u is an element of the domain of the model under investigation, then X s (u) will mean that the point of the tape of TM corresponding to u contains the symbol s. Similarly, for an input alphabet symbol t ∈ Σ, P t (u) will mean that the point of the tape of TM corresponding to u contains the symbol t.
The sentence ϕ TM will contain subformulae which are essentially (but not exactly, as we shall 
where χ ′ is a formula that forces x 2 head to be interpreted as the successor of x 1 head with respect to Succ. It is possible that no successor of x 1 head exists in the current model. In that case a successor can be constructed by appropriately using the operators Iz and I Succuv . To cover this case, define χ ′′ 1 to be the formula 
where χ ′′ forces the fresh point z to be the successor of x 1 head with respect to Succ, and χ ′ forces x 2 head to be the successor of x 1 head . Let α be a formula that states that x 1 head has a successor with respect to Succ in the current model. Define χ 1 to be the conjunction (α → χ ′ 1 ) ∧ (¬α → χ ′′ 1 ). head is interpreted as the point corresponding to the beginning position of the head of TM. It is not difficult to see that ϕ TM corresponds to TM in the desired way.
We then prove that every sentence of L spefifying a property of word models can be simulated by a Turing machine. For this purpose, we use König's Lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (König). Let T be a finitely branching tree with infinitely many nodes. Then T contains an infinite branch.
In the following, accepting means halting in an accepting state, and rejecting means halting in a rejecting (i.e., non-accepting) state. 2. Let U ⊆ Σ * be the set of words w such that M (w) |= − ϕ. Then for all w ∈ Σ * , TM rejects w iff w ∈ U .
Proof. Fix some positive integer k. Given an input word w, the Turing machine TM first enumerates all plays of G(M (w), / 0, +, ϕ) with k rounds or less. If ∃ wins such a play, TM checks whether there is a winning strategy for ∃ that always leads to a win in k or fewer rounds, meaning that no play where ∃ follows the strategy lasts for k + 1 rounds or more, and ∃ wins all plays where she follows her strategy. Similarly, if ∀ wins a play with k or fewer rounds, TM checks whether there is a winning strategy for ∀ that always leads to a win in at most k rounds. If there is such a strategy for ∃ (∀), then TM halts in an accepting (rejecting) state.
If no winning strategy is found, the machine TM checks all plays with k + 1 rounds. Again, if ∃ wins such a play, TM checks whether there is a winning strategy for ∃ that always leads to a win in at most k + 1 rounds, and similarly for ∀. Again, if a winning strategy for ∃ (∀) is found, then TM halts in an accepting (rejecting) state.
If no winning strategy is found, the machine scans all plays of the length k + 2, and so on. This process of scanning increasingly long plays is carried on potentially infinitely long. Now assume, for the sake of contradiction, that ∃ (∀) has a winning strategy with arbitrarily long plays resulting from following the strategy. Then the game tree restricted to paths where ∃ (∀) follows the strategy has infinitely many nodes. Let T denote the restriction of the game tree to paths where the strategy is followed. Since each game position can have only finitely many successor positions, and since T is infinite, we conclude by König's lemma that T has an infinite branch. Thus the strategy of ∃ (∀) cannot be a winning strategy. This is a contradiction. Hence each winning strategy has a finite bound n such that each play where the strategy is followed, goes on for at most n rounds.
Thus TM has the desired properties. The crucial issue here is that there exist a finite number of possible moves at every position of the game. This finiteness is due to the underlying models always being finite and properties of the operators of the logic L .
Note that our translations of Turing machines to formulae of L and formulae of L to Turing machines are both effective.
Arbitrary Structures
Above we limited attention to word models. This is not necessary, as Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 can easily be generalized to the context of arbitrary finite structures. In this section we show how this generalization can be done.
When investigating computations on structure classes (rather than strings), Turing machines of course operate on encodings of structures. We will use the encoding scheme of [16] . Let τ be a finite relational vocabulary and A a finite τ-structure. In order to encode the structure A by a binary string, we first need to define a linear ordering of the domain A of A. Let < A denote such an ordering.
Let R ∈ τ be a k-ary relation symbol. The encoding enc(R A ) of R A is the |A| k -bit string defined as follows. Consider an enumeration of all k-tuples over A in the lexicographic order defined with respect to < A . In the lexicographic order, (a 1 , ..., a k ) is smaller than (a ′ 1 , ..., a ′ k ) iff there exists i ∈ {1, ..., k} such that a i < a ′ i and a j = a ′ j for all j < i. There are |A| k tuples in A k . The string enc(R A ) is the string t ∈ {0, 1} * of the length |A| k such that the bit t i of t = t 1 ...t |A| k is 1 if and only if the i-th tuple (a 1 , ..., a k ) ∈ A k in the lexicographic order is in the relation R A .
The encoding enc(A) is defined as follows. We first order the relations in τ. Let p be the number of relations in τ, and let R 1 , ..., R p enumerate the symbols in τ according to the order. We define
Notice that the encoding of A depends on the order < A and the ordering of the relation symbols in τ.
Let C be the class of exactly all finite τ-models. Let C + , C − and C 0 be subclasses of C such that the following conditions hold.
2. The classes are disjoint, i.e., the intersection of any two of the three classes is empty.
We say that (C + , C − , C 0 ) is a Turing classification of finite τ-models if there exists a Turing machine TM such that the following conditions hold.
1. The input alphabet of TM is {0, 1}.
2. TM rejects every input string that is not of the type enc(A) for any finite τ-strucure A.
3. There exists an ordering < τ of τ such that the following conditions hold.
(a) Let A ∈ C . Let enc(A) and enc ′ (A) be two encodings of A, both using the order < τ of τ but possibly a different ordering of A. Then one of the following three conditions holds. i. TM accepts both strings enc(A) and enc ′ (A). ii. TM rejects both strings enc(A) and enc ′ (A). iii. TM diverges on both input strings enc(A) and enc ′ (A). (b) Let A ∈ C . Let enc(A) be an encoding of A according to the order < τ . The following conditions hold.
iii. TM diverges on the input enc(A) iff A ∈ C 0 . We say that TM witnesses the Turing classification
The logic L combines the expressivity of first-order logic with the possibility of building fresh relations over fresh domain elements. The recursive looping capacity enables a flexible way of using such fresh constructions. Therefore it is not difficult to see that the following theorem holds. Theorem 5.1. Let τ be a finite relational vocabulary and (C + , C − , C 0 ) a Turing classification of finite τ-models. Let TM be a Turing machine that witnesses the classification (C + , C − , C 0 ). Then there exists a sentence ϕ TM of L (τ) such that the following conditions hold for finite τ-models A.
Proof sketch. The simulation of a machine TM operating on encodings of structures A is done by a sentence ϕ TM of L as follows. The "input" to the formula ϕ TM is a finite τ-structure A. The formula ϕ TM first uses A in order to construct a word model M A that corresponds to a string enc(A) that encodes A. The domains of M A and A are disjoint. The relation symbols of M A are symbols in VAR SO , not symbols in τ. Once M A has been constructed, the formula ϕ TM uses M A in order to simulate the computation of TM on the string enc(A). The simulation is done in the way described in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The construction of the word model M A from A is not difficult. First a fresh successor relation S A over the domain of A is constructed using the operator I S xy . The symbol S is not in τ. Instead, we use a fresh symbol in VAR SO . Also, the successor symbol S will not be part of the vocabulary of the word model M A .
Let < A denote the linear order canonically associated with the successor relation S A . The order < A , together with an ordering of τ, define a string enc(A). The model M A is the word model corresponding to the string enc(A).
Due to the very high expressivity of the logic L , is not difficult to build M A using S A and possibly further auxiliary relations. Thus writing the formula ϕ TM is relatively straightforward. We skip further details. Theorem 5.2. Let τ be a finite relational vocabulary. Let ϕ be a τ-sentence of L . Then there exists a Turing classification (C + , C − , C 0 ) of finite τ-models such that for all finite τ-models A, the following conditions hold.
Proof. The proof is practically identical to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Generalized Quantifiers and Oracles
The relationship between oracles and Turing machines is analogous to the relationship between generalized quantifiers and logic. Oracles allow arbitrary jumps in computations in a similary way in which generalized quantifiers allow the assertion of arbitrary properties of relations. In this section we briefly discuss extensions of the logic L with generalized quantifiers. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider unary quantifiers of the width one, i.e., quantifiers of the type (1).
A unary generalized quantifier of the width one (cf. [17] ) is a class C of structures (A, B) such that the following conditions hold.
Below the word quantifier always means a unary generalized quantifier of the width one. Let Q be a quantifier. Let A be a model with the domain A. We define Q A := { B | (A, B) ∈ Q }. Extend the formula formation rules of first-order logic such that if ϕ is a formula and x a variable, then Qx ϕ is a formula. The operatorQx binds the variable x, so the set of free variables ofQx ϕ is obtained by removing x from the set of free variables of ϕ. The standard semantic clause for the formulaQx ϕ is as follows.
Let A be a model that interprets the non-logical symbols in ϕ. Let f be an assignment function that interprets the free variables inQx ϕ.
We then discuss how generalized quantifiers can be incorporated into the logic L . This simply amounts to extending the game-theoretic semantics such that generalized quantifiers are taken into account. This is accomplished in the canonical way described below. 5 Assume we have reached a position (A, f , +, ϕ) in a semantic game. If Q A = / 0, the player ∃ loses the play of the game. Otherwise the player ∃ chooses a set S ∈ Q A . The player ∀ then chooses either a point s ∈ S of a point s ′ ∈ A \ S. (Here A is of course the domain of A.) Suppose first that ∀ chooses s ∈ S. Then the game continues from the position (A, f [x → s], +, ϕ). Suppose then that ∀ chooses s ′ ∈ A \ S. Then the game continues from the position (A, f [x → s ′ ], −, ϕ). The intuition behind these moves is that ∃ first chooses the set S of exactly all witnesses for ϕ, and this set S must be in Q A . Then ∀ either opposes the claim that S contains only witnesses of S by choosing a potential counterexample s ∈ S, or alternatively, ∀ opposes the claim that S contains all witnesses of ϕ by choosing a potential further witness s ′ ∈ A \ S.
Assume then that we have reached a position (A, f , −, ϕ) in a semantic game. If Q A = / 0, the player ∀ loses the play of the game. Otherwise the player ∀ chooses a set S ∈ Q A . The player ∃ then chooses either a point s ∈ S of a point s ′ ∈ A \ S. Suppose that ∃ chooses s ∈ S. Then the game continues from the position (A, f [x → s], −, ϕ). Suppose then that ∃ chooses s ′ ∈ A \ S. Then the game continues from the position (A, f [x → s ′ ], +, ϕ).
It is straightforward to prove that these rules give a semantics such that in restriction to formulae of first-order logic extended with generalized quantifiers, the standard Tarski style semantics and the game-theoretic semantics are equivalent. For the sake of brevity, we shall not attempt to formulate extensions of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 that apply to extensions of L with quantifiers and Turing machines with corresponding oracles. Instead, further investigations in this direction are left for the future.
Concluding remarks
It is easy to see that various interesting operators can be added to L without sacrificing Turing-completeness. For example, second-order quantifiers can easily be added. There are only finitely many ways to interpret a quantified second-order variable in a finite model, and therefore König's lemma can still be applied so that Theorems 4.3 and 5.2 hold. Also, it is possible to add to L an operator that, say, adds |P(W )| fresh elements to the domain W , and then extends the interpretations of selected relation symbols and second-order variables non-deterministically to all of the new domain. In the finite, this operator does not add anything to the expressivity of L , but of course more delicate features of the underlying logic change.
Connections between L and team semantics ought to be investigated thoroughly. Both P and NP can be characterized nicely by logics based on team semantics; NP is captured by both dependence logic and IF logic, and P is captured on ordered models by inclusion logic (see [6] ). Further interesting complexity classes will probably be characterized in terms of logics based on team semantics in the near future. We conjecture that by attaching suitable operators to the atoms of L of the type k ∈ N, it should be possible to extend L such that resulting logics accomodate typical logics based on team semantics as fragments in a natural way. The game-theoretic approaches to team semantics developed in [4, 8, 15, 18, 21] provide some starting points for related investigations.
Let R be a binary relation symbol. Let L 0 denote the fragment of L that extends first-order logic by operators that enable the the manipulation of the relation R (only), the insertion of fresh points to the domain, and recursive looping. We conjecture that on models whose vocabulary contains the binary relation symbol R, already L 0 is Turing-complete. Indeed, this does not seem to be difficult to prove using suitable gadgets, but we leave it as a conjecture at this stage.
Finally, it would be interesting to classify fragments of L according to whether their (finite) satisfiability problem is decidable. This would nicely extend the research on decidability of fragments of first-order logic.
